![]() ![]() Furthermore, massive Russian mobilization and conscription efforts have inevitably altered force-to-terrain and force-on-force ratios. Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin’s illegal annexation of Ukraine's Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, and the recently announced mobilization to reinforce the Russian military, demonstrate that Moscow has no interest in peace talks. Due to the successful counterattacks in Kharkiv and Kherson in the autumn of 2022, Ukraine sees itself on the front foot for the first time in the war. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has shown a willingness to negotiate. The war in Ukraine will continue, in some form, for the foreseeable future.3 A logical next move would be augmenting Romania’s A2/AD capacity by deploying a complex deterrent of anti-ship missiles, layered air defenses, heavy MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System), and tactical ballistic missile systems (i.e., HIMARS/ATACMS) as well as potent aerial and naval robotic warfare systems. By establishing new multinational battle groups in the alliance’s east (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary), NATO has geopolitically extended its Enhanced Forward Presence from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. In response to the heightened Russian threat to European security, the alliance has augmented the allied military posture in its eastern frontiers. Romania has the geostrategic edge to become a central A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) hub for NATO.Lessons learned by Ukraine could be applied to a new generation of coastal defense and a new concept of operations (CONOPS)-centered on robotic warfare capabilities, information superiority, and anti-ship missile edge-which could be relevant in places like Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea and even Taiwan. At the time of writing, Ukraine has destroyed eight Russian naval ships and damaged another four 2-even though Ukraine effectively does not have a navy. Ukraine’s domestically produced anti-ship cruise missile Neptune, combined with creatively used and adapted disruptive weapons systems like the Bayraktar TB2 drones, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and the Naval Strike Missile, has proven to be effective at coastal defense. The combat-tested maritime defense capabilities rapidly developed by Ukraine offer an opportunity to improve the security of the Black Sea and beyond.As policymakers develop a Black Sea strategy, they will need to consider these important facts. ![]() Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is on its own now. The Russian General Staff cannot send non–Black Sea naval platforms into the hot zone until the war comes to an end. These restrictions have implications for NATO and Russia: they will reduce NATO’s maritime presence in the Black Sea and will reduce Moscow’s ability to project maritime power in the Eastern Mediterranean. 1 There is no reason to assume this restriction will be lifted anytime soon, as the closure is directly linked to the ongoing war. Although Turkey has invoked Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which pertains to the belligerents’ navies (vessels that are not home-ported in the Black Sea), the Turkish Foreign Office’s diplomatic rhetoric implied that Ankara would also prohibit outsider naval activity. Ankara will continue to block warships from transiting into the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits for the foreseeable future.This strategy should be based on the following assumptions: The US and its allies need to develop a comprehensive Black Sea strategy that addresses a new geopolitical reality, one shaped most notably by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Future reports will present findings on air warfare and land warfare trends in the broader Black Sea region. This report will focus on the maritime agenda. Any comprehensive regional political-military policy must therefore offer a multidomain strategy. Despite the overwhelming odds, Ukraine has been able to deliver significant blows to the Russian Navy-most sensationally by sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva missile cruiser and by striking Russian platforms with unmanned surface combatants in October.īlack Sea geopolitics is a complex phenomenon. Turkey has reminded the world of Ankara’s regional importance by closing the Turkish Straits to the belligerent parties’ vessels (in practice the Russian Navy, except for the platforms home-ported in the Black Sea), which it carried out under authority granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention. ![]() Following the capture of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in May, Russia has effectively turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake and is also seeking maximum control of the Black Sea. ![]() With Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region. ![]()
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